Digital watermarking is often modelled as the transmission of a message over a noisy channel denoted as "watermark channel". Distorsions introduced by the watermark channel result mainly from attacks but, depending on the attack, may include interference from the original signal. One of the main differences with classical transmission situations comes from the fact that only perceptual distortions have to be taken into account. However, measuring the perceptual impact an attack has on a watermarked signal is currently an unsolved problem. Possible means of circumventing this problem would be (i) to define the distortion in a socalled "perceptual domain" and defining an "ad hoc" equivalence between objective and perceptual distortion, or (ii) to define an "equivalent distortion", by removing from the attack noise the part that is correlated to the host signal. We concentrate on the second approach, and first show that the resulting "equivalent" attack is a particular case of a throughly studied channel: attacks by filtering plus additive noise. However, our approach emphasises the fact that the additive noise has to be decorrelated with the signal. Finally, the method is applied to desynchronization attacks on audio signals, provides the corresponding capacities, and outlines further work.
INTRODUCTION
Information embedding is concerned with the reliable transmission of information embedded into a host signal. Digital watermarking can also be viewed as a communication problem: An information ¢ to be sent to the receiver is encoded into a signal . This watermarked data is sent to the receiver through a channel, denoted as the watermark channel, which is unknown by nature. When processed by the "channel", the signal might be distorted (additive noise, filtering, non-linear processing) or even replaced by some other data. Consequently, the attack results in an unavoidable signal degradation.This process is denoted as the attack . In robust watermarking, the goal of an attacker is to impair or even remove the embedded watermark information. This paper addresses the problem of characterizing the attacks in such a way that the model is (i) accurate, in terms of perceptual distortions, and (ii) analytically tractable. After presenting the general watermark communication scheme for a general channel attack , we show that the attack can be modelled by amplitude scaling plus additive noise. The equivalence is obtained by introducing two 
Fig. 1. An abstract communication model for watermarking
distorsions measures: objective and perceptible. We show that the resulting "equivalent" model can accurately characterize both watermark detection process and original signal quality loss due to the channel attack.
THE WATERMARK CHANNEL AND ITS MODEL
A watermark channel refers to all operations a watermarked document may be subject to. These include intentional and nonintentional manipulations. Initially, the watermarking system was designed independently of the channel characterization, while more recent works tune the system to be robust under the worst possible attack in a given category. One difficulty is thus to define tractable channel models that accurately fit the possible impairments (either intentional or non-intentional). Fig. 1 shows an abstract communication model for watermarking in presence of a general channel attack . The classical communication channels (BSC, AWGN, Rayleigh, ...) are not likely to accurately model a watermark channel in real world scenarios. A better understanding of this watermark channel can be achieved by considering attacks not through their nature (or category) but through their impact on the watermarked signal: Attacks on the original signal can in general easily be modelled by filtering plus additive noise. At this stage, a traightforward model may invlve a signal dependent noise. In the following, we study a special case of this filtering plus additive noise channel and provide some tools for increasing its usefulness (through noise decorrelation process). The proposed approach is then used to focus on desynchronization attacks. Insights from the Additive White Gaussian Noise and Jitter (AWGN&J )channel initially introduced by Baggen [1] in the context of data storage applications is used to investigate the effect of desynchronization attacks on several watermarking schemes.
A distorsion model for a watermark channel
Consider the general channel attack shown in Fig. 1 . In an attempt to fool the receiver, the attacker may use a set of admis-
which will be denoted as an objective measure. After the channel attack, the watermarked signal must remain of sufficient quality. 
Note that the proposed model (6) has already been studied in recent watermarking related works as in [2] , [3] and [4] . to characterize the channel attack when no ambiguity is possible.
Scaling Factor and Desynchronization noise
Using Eqs. (4) and (6), it comes
Recalling that the watermarked signal 
Objective and Perceptible distortion measures
In a view to fully characterize the effect of the general attack ) ¡ £
, we use the model 6. Putting the received signal in the form gives more insights onto original signal quality loss due to the attack and allows relatively easy perceptible degradation evaluation. In most cases, amplitude scaling should not be considered as a real distorsion. In particular, for audio signals, c is a gain factor that induces practically no audible degradation. We introduce a percepual distorsion measure in attack characterization so that its overall impact can be described with:
(a) The traditional objective MSE measure, to which we will refer as objective distorsion assessed above and given by This model, despite its simplicity, is quite accurate, as will be illustrated later.
AWGN&J CHANNEL
In this section, after a short presentation of the AWGN&J channel, AWGN&J desynchronization effects are investigated differently: (i) using common Inter Symbol Interference (ISI) assumption commonly known in the communcation theory, and (ii) using the model (6) . Both models are finally compared. an AWGN&J channel is an AWGN channel in which the signal is, in addition to the gaussian noise, randomly sampled. More precisely, the receiver has to decide on th epresence of a watermark based on attacks using the AWGN&J model already exist, [5] [6] [7] . However, in these works, the desynchronization noise is almost usually considered uncorrelated with the watermarked signal. This will not be assumed here.
AWGN&J channel desynchronization
Under appropriate band-limited assumptions, the time-continuous signal 
Eq. 14 shows that introducing a constant time shift is equivalent to filtering the watermarked signal. Alternatively, it can be understood as first, attenuating the watermarked signal will not be decorrelated from ¥ , except in very special cases. Based on these equations, one can already explicit some specificities of watermarking channels including jitter:
(a) The influence of the jitter depends on the watermarked signal power. Hence, the well known embedder strategy consisting in increasing the watermark power to improve detector performance in case of AWGN attacks is no longer the optimum strategy, since ,at the same time, it enforces the impact of the desynchronization attack.
(b) Since the jitter noise is somehow proportional to the original signal, embedding the watermark into a transform domain where the original data is less powerful may alleviate the effect of the jitter.
In the following section, the AWGN&J channel is characterized using the approach introduced above. The goal is, as stated before, to remove from the ISI term 
Constant time shift
The scaling factor . Obviously, the proposed model has more significance, since one could hardly argue that a time shift by ¦ only results in noise.
Random time shift
Consider now the random jitter case. Again, we have . For each, capacity is derived diffrently, (i) using the model 6 (-.), and (ii) under the plain model (-). It is clearly seen that the capacity is much larger than could be expected from the plain model. Also, the gap increases with the deviation . Furthermore, other results can be obtained using game theory : If ever an attacker has a perceived distortion budget, with two ways of using this budget : either by introducing jitter, or by using additive noise, or any combination of both, what is the best choice for him ? Conversely, what is the best tuning for the defender, knowing the best potential attack ? Again, in this case, the use of the "perceptual distortion" defined above for jitter leads to more realistics results (which will be reported elsewhere). 
